

## Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 01316 091420Z

40

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 H-03 NSC-07 ACDA-19 EB-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 /123 W

----- 049390

P R 091225Z MAR 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4523

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 1316

E.O. 11652: GDS 12-31-80

TAGS: MCAP, NATO

SUBJECT: NATO FORCE PROPOSALS/GOALS 1975-1980

REF: A. STATE 042348

B. USNATO 1233

C. USNATO 0404

SUMMARY: UK, DUTCH AND FRG DELEGATIONS, WHILE EXPRESSING PERSONAL SUPPORT FOR US OBJECTIVES, HAVE PREDICTED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WILL BE STRONGLY NEGATIVE TO U.S. INITIATIVE ON FORCE PROPOSALS/GOALS. THEY HAVE ARGUED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WILL MOVE ONLY SLOWLY TOWARD GREATER EMPHASIS ON NATO FORCE PLANNING AS OPPOSED TO NATIONAL PLANNING. THEY ALSO PREDICTED RESISTANCE ON GROUNDS THAT DRC/DPC, COMPOSED LARGELY OF CIVILIANS, WOULD "OVERRIDE" IN EFFECT PRIORITIES SET BY NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES. MISSION RECOMMENDS COURSE OF ACTION TO ACHIEVE US OBJECTIVES. END SUMMARY.

1. DRC REPS WHO HAVE COMMENTED SO FAR TO MISSION OFFICERS ON FORCE PROPOSALS/GOALS ARGUED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WILL CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 01316 091420Z

MOVE SLOWLY TOWARD GREATER EMPHASIS ON NATO FORCE PLANNING AS OPPOSED TO NATIONAL PLANNING. NETHERLANDS REP (CARSTENS) ADVISED US REP (CLINARD), MARCH 7, THAT HIS PRINCIPAL OBJECTIONS HAD TO DO WITH DIFFICULTY OF GETTING

NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES AND ALSO NATIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO ACCEPT FORCE GOALS PRIORITIES SET BY DRC. HE SAW NO POSSIBILITY THAT NETHERLANDS MILITARY AUTHORITIES WOULD ACCEPT DRC DEVELOPMENT OF ALLIANCE-WIDE PRIORITIES. MISSION OFFICER POINTED OUT THAT US HAD URGED IN AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S LETTER TO SECRETARY GENERAL OF JAN 25 (REF C) THAT MILITARY COMMITTEE BE ASKED TO PERFORM THIS VERY TASK; BUT HIS REQUEST HAD NOT BEEN HEEDDED. US CONTINUES TO HOLD THAT ALLIES MUST MAKE FORCE GOALS MORE REALISTIC, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT MILITARY NEEDS AND ALSO RELEVANT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS. DRC, DPC OR EVEN DPC AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL SHOULD NOW PERFORM THAT TASK. CARSTEN SEEMED PERSONALLY SOMEWHAT SYMPATHETIC TO IDEA UNDERLYING U.S. INITIATIVE, BUT FELT THAT SUCH A MOVE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE EARLIER IN THE PROCESS--SPECIFICALLY, IN PREPARATION OF MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE TO NMA'S. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT, IF U.S. CARRIED QUESTION OF "ESSENTIAL LIST" OF FORCES GOALS TO DPC MINISTERIAL LEVEL (REF B), WHOLE PROCESS WOULD BE HELD UP AND ALLIES WOULD HAVE NO FORCE GOALS AT ALL.

2. ON MARCH 7, UK DEFENSE CONSELLOR (MACDONALD) ADVISED MISSION OFFICER (CLINARD) THAT TIMING OF U.S. INITIATIVE WAS VERY POOR. HE RECALLED THAT SECRETARY SCHLESINGER HAD SAID AT LAST DECEMBER'S DPC MINISTERIAL THAT U.S. WOULD BE PROPOSING SOME CHANGES IN FORCE PLANNING PROCEDURES, BUT THAT NONE HAD BEEN PROPOSED UNTIL A FEW HOURS BEFORE MARCH 5 DRC MEETING, WHEN US FLOATED WHAT WAS, IN EFFECT, A BASIC REVISION TO PAST PRACTICES ON DEVELOPMENT OF FORCE GOALS. THIS, HE SAID MADE IT VERY DIFFICULT TO GET CONSIDERED REACTIONS FROM ALLIED CAPITALS IN TIME FOR NECESSARY REVISIONS ON FORCE GOALS.

3. ON 8 MARCH, NETHERLANDS REP (CARSTEN) AND FRG REPS (BGEN FERVERT AND CAPT ARENDT) ASSURED US REP (BGEN BOWMAN) THAT MOST MEMBERS OF THE DRC AGREED WITH WHAT THE US GOVERNMENT WAS TRYING TO DO IN THE FORCE PROPOSALS/GOALS EXERCISE, BUT EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS COULD NOT BE MOVED THAT RAPIDLY. CARSTEN FELT THAT WE HAD TO CONVINCE CAPITALS THAT THIS WAS REALLY THEIR CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 01316 091420Z

IDEA RATHER THAN AN IMPOSITION BY THE US AND THAT THIS WOULD TAKE CONSIDERABLE TIME AND EFFORT TO ACCOMPLISH. BGEN FERVERT APOLOGIZED FOR THE IMPROBABLE POSITION GIVEN HIM BY HIS GOVERNMENT FOR THE 5 MARCH DRC SESSION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE FRG HAD NO FINANCIAL LIMITATIONS ON ACCEPTING ALL THE PROPOSALS. HE FELT THAT HE WAS BADLY SERVED BY THE EXPERTS THAT CAME FROM BONN WHO DID NOT PRODUCE GOOD REASONS FOR THEIR POSITIONS. HE OBSERVED THAT THE DELAY IN THE US FORCE GOALS DRC SESSION PROBABLY MEANT THAT US REPS WERE DETERMINED TO AVOID A SIMILAR POOR RECORD.

4. IN FUTURE DRC FORCE GOALS SESSIONS, MISSION WILL PUSH FOR A REALISTIC SET OF FORCE GOALS THAT CAN BE USED TO GUIDE AND

JUDGE NATIONAL PLANS AND PROGRAMS. MISSION EXPECTS TO SUCCEED IN THE DRC MAKING MANY OF THE CHANGES IN FORCE GOALS RECOMMENDED BY WASHINGTON. WHERE UNSUCCESSFUL, MISSION WILL STATE US POSITION EXPLICITLY IN THE FORCE GOAL REPORT AND WILL TAKE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS TO THE DPC LEVEL AS NECESSARY.

5. IF THE US EFFORT TO ACHIEVE REALISTIC FORCE GOALS IS NOT FULLY SUCCESSFUL THIS SPRING, MISSION RECOMMENDS THAT WASHINGTON CONSIDER APPROVING THEM ONLY ON A PRELIMINARY BASIS AND ON CONDITION THAT NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE ASSISTED AS APPROPRIATE BY MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS PERFORM THE NECESSARY EVALUATION OF FORCE PROPOSALS, ALONG THE LINES OF REF A, AND PREPARE AN ADJUSTED SET OF PROPOSALS FOR RECONSIDERATION AND FINAL APPROVAL BY THE DPC IN THE FALL.  
MCAULIFFE.

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 11 JUN 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 09 MAR 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** garlanwa  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974ATO01316  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS 12-31-80  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** NATO  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19740381/abbrytrr.tel  
**Line Count:** 125  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** n/a  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** A. STATE 042348 B. USNATO 1233 C. USNATO 0404  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** garlanwa  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 10 APR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <10 APR 2002 by ifshinsr>; APPROVED <30-Aug-2002 by garlanwa>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** NATO FORCE PROPOSALS/GOALS 1975-1980  
**TAGS:** MCAP, NATO  
**To:** STATE  
SECDEF INFO USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR  
USLOSACLANT  
CINCLANT  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

